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Abstract: 
As John Agnew (Political geography: a reader, 1997) has argued, political and economic change 
often occasions competing visions of the scales that are appropriate for organizing particular 
political and economic activities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the European Union, and 
eastern Germany offers compelling evidence of the contested nature of contemporary scalar 
politics. Yet a recent debate in human geography (see, e.g. Marston et al., Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers 30:416–432, 2005) calls into question the very concept of scale 
and rejects its hierarchical conceptualization. In light of this debate, it is appropriate to draw on 
real-world case studies to examine the ways in which geography figures into policy. Drawing on 
field work in Saxony, evidence is offered in the form of competing visions of regionalism in the 
EU context. The evidence presented complicates both hierarchical and flat notions of scale. The 
current process of querying space to identify those scales that are best-suited for the globalized 
economy offers insights into both the socially constructed nature of scale as well as the ways in 
which scalar lenses help to illuminate the geographical aspects (and consequences) of strategies 
for coping with structural changes. 
 regionalism | European Union Germany | transboundary cooperation | political Keywords:
geography | geography | politics  
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Introduction 
 
How are we to make sense of new, innovative spaces of governance in modern Europe? 
Obviously, this is a question that has been the subject of robust discussion in geography, political 
science, and other social sciences (Brenner 2000; Gualini 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2003; 
Jönsson et al. 2000; Keating 2003; Le Galès and Lequesne 1998; MacLeod 1999; Paasi 2002). 
The European Union (EU), through its regional policy, has provided local, regional, and national 
policymakers, as well as private interests and NGOs, with the means to act outside of the neat 
containers of classical, hierarchical political geographies of the state. With the speed of change, 
there is of course the risk that the novelty of new spaces of governance be overstated. After all, 
the structures of the EU were set up to ensure the ongoing influence of the national member 
states. Even in some ostensibly novel political geographic contexts, ranging from the drawing of 
administrative boundaries for statistical gathering purposes (NUTS) to the establishment of 
international cooperative arrangements between communities and regions, national states 
continue to leave their own bureaucratic imprint upon what might otherwise be considered 
uniquely “European” spaces. Yet it is also increasingly clear that we can no longer treat the 
delimitation of space under the pretense of Europe as just another in the neat, logically nested 
levels of territorial organization with the nation-state forming the focal point. 
In this article, the approach to these geographical spaces makes use of the analytical lens of 
scale. In human geography, scale is perhaps most usefully viewed as an epistemological lens that 
shapes perceptions of social activities and relations (i.e. politics, economics, etc.). On this 
subject, Adam Moore has noted that far from scale being a meaningless abstraction, there are 
very material consequences when specific scalar formulations are successfully disseminated and 
utilized by powerful political actors and institutions to further specific political projects (2008, p. 
214). 
Examples of such “material consequences” are examined later in the paper. 
At the same time, it is important to point out that the example of transboundary regionalism used 
in this paper is not the only possible entry point into the usefulness of scalar perspectives on 
contemporary territorial restructuring in Europe. One possible alternative is offered by work by 
Church and Reid (1996) on cross-border interurban policy networks across the English Channel. 
Such interurban networks are not particularly prevalent along Germany’s eastern border, the area 
examined in this paper, though there are undoubtedly some of the same issues at hand.1 
It would be incorrect to assume that regionalism occurring with the financial blessing of the EU 
is simply the regional scale (transboundary place) being activated by another scale (EU) to create 
success stories at yet another scale (global). Such a narrative, which is fairly typical in the 
literature on European regionalism, paints a neater picture than my own research supports. In 
fact, regionalism in this part of the EU is not only mediated, but also actively co-opted by local, 
regional and national actors for their own purposes—ones not always in line with the stated goals 
of regional policy. Consequently, EU institutions are perhaps best seen as one of the governance 
contexts within which local and regional actors must negotiate (see Hooghe and Marks 2003). 
With this background in mind, my purpose in this paper is twofold. First, focusing on one 
particular instance of transboundary regional cooperation along the international border of the 
federal state of Saxony, Germany, I examine how transboundary space is being incorporated into 
strategies for coping with structural change in eastern Germany. The use of the term 
“transboundary” is intended to encompass the range of terms (in English, crossborder, 
transnational, interregional, in German, grenzüberschreitende Kooperation) used to describe 
regional cooperation across international borders. This provides a timely illustration of the 
strategic mobilization of transboundary regional scale by various actors, and it offers insights 
into the experimental character of transboundary governance. Second, the larger relevance of this 
case is considered in the second part of the paper. In particular, the case study is situated within 
ongoing debates in human geography over the appropriateness of scalar-driven analysis. 
Regionalism strategies under the auspices of EU is at least in part viewed by local, regional and 
national elites as one out of many strategies for addressing perceived inadequacies of post-
unification restructuring strategies pursued to date in eastern Germany. Scale proves a useful tool 
in order to examine and make sense of this type of regionalism. 
Situating eastern Germany in Europe 
 
Of late, since around 2000, many stakeholders in Germany—voters, political leaders, and 
business elites—have grown restless with the progress made in their national unification project 
(see Cooke 2005; Dennis and Kolinsky 2004; Lentz 2007). The enormous idealism and political 
capital generated by events in 1989 sustained the notion that eastern Germany should be lifted up 
based on a national-political ideal (“we are one people”), but many signs suggest that those 
sources of sustenance have run their course. Results to show for the trillion-and-a-half euros 
invested (west → east) are perceived as being too thin. With the enlargement of the EU, 
moreover, there is a growing sense that investments in eastern Germany are futile without radical 
structural reforms to stop the bleeding of capital and skilled labor occurring there. It seems 
eastern Germany offers little to corporate leaders and other potential investors that is not 
available further to the east (at much lower cost), nor does it offer enough opportunities to young 
people entering the labor market, which helps explain the migrations to job markets in Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg, and other points in the West. 
The widely-held belief that East Germany could be subsumed into West Germany’s governance 
and economic structures and rise to the West’s level of development if only enough money were 
spent across the entire space of East Germany has been nearly completely abandoned. A 
consensus has emerged among policy elites in the West and East of Germany alike that the 
process of ‘rebuilding the East’ [Aufbau Ost] has not sufficiently taken into account the realities 
of an increasingly global economy, for which even the western part of the country was not well-
prepared (Müller 2005). 
As the recriminations of each side against the other grow louder in the media and the body 
politic, the inadequacy of existing territorial structures has emerged as partly to blame for the 
lack of progress. As Agnew (1997) has pointed out, political and economic change often 
occasions competing visions of the scales that are appropriate for organizing particular political 
and economic activities. In light of the political imperative that has emerged to “fix” the 
inadequacies of governance approaches in eastern Germany, a number of strategies have come to 
the fore as promising remedies, such as focusing resources on promoting industrial clusters, 
consolidating jurisdictional territories deemed too small for global competitiveness, and pursuing 
closer cooperation with neighboring regions in Poland and the Czech Republic. The latter of 
these offer insights not only into how processes of territorial restructuring in Germany are being 
shaped and impacted by European integration, but also into how the concept of scale can assist 
us in making sense of such processes. The goal of such strategies it seems is to turn a liability of 
geographical location—along a border with lower-wage locations to the east and south—into a 
strategic advantage by transgressing the border. This is, naturally, easier said than done. Yet the 
key point from a geographical perspective is that the existing structures and options for 
expanding horizons across borders are not sufficient for the task at hand. In light of this, how 
local and regional elites have become creative and experimental, encouraged in turn by the 
national level, is a key avenue for understanding the nature of territorial restructuring in 
contemporary Europe. 
Regionalism in eastern Germany 
 
The current process of querying space in Germany to identify those scales that are best-suited for 
the globalized economy includes transboundary regionalism. Unlike western Germany or the rest 
of western Europe, regionalism in eastern Germany was imposed practically overnight as the two 
Germanys reunified and the East was incorporated into the structures of the European 
Community. Regionalism did not evolve over a lengthy period in a context of flush public 
coffers and post-war making-up as it had in the West. Aside from its border with the FRG, East 
Germany bordered only other communist states (Poland and Czechoslovakia), which entered the 
EU much later (2004). As a result, transboundary regions are institutionally and functionally less 
well developed along eastern Germany’s borders with the Czech Republic and Poland than, for 
example, the Maas-Rhine Region (D-B-NL) or the Upper Rhine Region (D-CH-F).2 With the 
accession of eastern neighbors to the EU, however, there has been awakened interest in 
cooperation, or as one official put it to me, “coopetition” [in German: Koopkurrenz], a 
neologism appropriated from the realm of business intended to suggest places across the border 
from each other are both cooperating and competing for investment at the same time.3 Yet the 
character of cooperation has undergone a perceptible shift from one of ‘feel-good’ collaboration 
to one geared towards finding a place on a global map of attractive places. 
Case study: German–Czech–Polish border area 
 
Perhaps nowhere is the changing character of transboundary regionalism more evident than in 
the border area between Germany, the Czech Republic, and Poland. For purposes of 
simplification, I have focused my attention on Saxony, eastern Germany’s largest state in terms 
of population, and the one with the longest international border (with the Czech Republic and 
Poland) at 577 km. Saxony is the lead partner on more international cooperation arrangements 
than any other region in Europe, and within Germany, Saxony has the largest number of 
partnerships financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).4 
The role of the EU 
 
Regions under the EU rubric Interreg IIIA, soon to be IVA, which are often referred to as 
Euroregions, have historically been the most important component to cross-border regionalism in 
Saxony and elsewhere in Europe. Such regions are generally designed to foster cultural exchange 
and ‘good feelings’ in a border area, as well as to pursue more functional integration of 
infrastructure and services. These regions are typically circumscribed by territorial and 
administrative boundaries reflecting the participating states’ administrative political geographies. 
As such, Euroregions tend to be 
1. focused on projects with particular relevance to rural areas (such as environmental 
management, school exchanges, and infrastructure linkages), 
  
2. economically peripheral, reflecting their location along national borders with previously low 
levels of permeability, and 
  
3. below the radar of state-led, urban-centric governance strategies for growth, such as industrial 
clusters, strategic R&D investments, and investment attraction. 
  
Given relatively recent histories of war, expulsion, and expatriation in this particular area, few 
would question the utility and potential benefits of such regions in lessening the role of borders 
as national markers. Yet such goals are somewhat passé in a Europe where the focus of late has 
been on making its “fast world” of global cities even more powerful, while the more peripheral 
“‘slow world’ of catatonic rural settings, declining manufacturing regions, and disadvantaged 
slums” falls even further behind (Knox 2002, p. 329). 
Contemporary efforts at regionalism within the context of the EU may today be only 
[…] regions in discourses’ and ‘regions on paper’, but they may some day turn into ‘regions as 
social practice’ with very concrete effects on the daily lives of people. (Paasi 2002, pp. 198–200) 
Here is not the place to review EU regional policies in any detail. Suffice it to say that since the 
mid-1970s, when the focus of redistribution in the European context shifted from sectoral 
supports (e.g. steel and agriculture) to geographical supports (e.g. regional policy), regionalism 
initiatives have become increasingly widespread. Such redistributive mechanisms became even 
more pressing when the single market was enacted in the 1980s, and EU leaders sought to blunt 
anti-Europe sentiment that might be caused by growing regional disparities brought on by 
lowered trade barriers (Hall and van der Wee 1995, p. 9). With multiple enlargements, the focus 
on redistribution has shifted more to socio-political and economic integration as the primary 
goals of regional policy, and examples are found along the borders between the original EU 
members and recent entrants. 
Nevertheless, Euroregions (and other mesoscale transboundary regions with different labels) still 
make up the lion’s share of monies (approximately 75%) available to local and regional actors 
wishing to cooperate across borders. My research suggests that the trend is away from the 
cultural interchange (‘people-to-people’ projects) and low-level cooperation on issues such as 
environmental management, and towards more “unusual regionalism” in terms of cross-border 
cooperation (Deas and Lord 2006). In the case of the former, big ideas of fostering 
transboundary interaction often involved quotidian things directly relevant only to those in the 
immediate vicinity of that border: which fire department would respond in case of a forest fire; 
how public transportation schedules might be coordinated to lessen the disadvantages of 
peripheral location along an international border; how schools could foster the learning of the 
language spoken just across the border. As the case study I draw on below illustrates, border 
Euroregions are viewed to serve a useful purpose, but the requirements of global competition 
require ‘scaling up’ of transboundary space if it is to meet the demands of global capitalism. The 
reasoning is really quite simple: a region must possess a critical mass of strategic assets such as 
infrastructure, labor, educational and training facilities, and amenities in order to be attractive for 
global investment, and Euroregions are viewed as being too small to be serious global contenders 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1 
Intensity of transboundary cooperation in the European Union. Source: ESPON Atlas: Mapping 
the structure of the European territory, October 2006, p. 57, 
http://www.espon.eu/mmp/online/website/content/publications/98/1235/file_2489/final-
atlas_web.pdf 
As a consequence, local and regional elites—enabled by officials at state and European levels—
are increasingly looking past Euroregions in their attempts to ‘create’ regions capable of ‘going 
global.’ Quite obviously then, scale, as it has been defined and deployed by geographers in the 
last two decades, is invaluable in understanding such processes. In order to explain this line of 
reasoning, I move briefly through the actors involved in setting up transboundary space as a site 
of competitive advantage. 
Role of the German state 
 
As other authors have noted, the state is an active participant in territorial restructuring and 
rescaling strategies (Brenner 2003; Mansfield 2005). This extends to regional cooperation across 
borders. The federal government of Germany views this as an opportunity for eastern Germany 
to become less dependent on transfers from the West. As described earlier, pressure has been 
steadily increasing to show progress in ‘rebuilding the east,’ and excerpts from texts by 
Wolfgang Tiefensee, a former mayor of Leipzig and since 2005 the federal official responsible 
for the New Federal States,5 illustrate that transboundary space is to play a key role in this: 
The large structural political challenges in Europe require increasingly not only international 
cooperation between states, but between all actors who partake in regional development—
particularly regions, cities and communities. […] Locational advantage and development 
chances of a region depend today no longer just on geographical position, infrastructure, or 
economic structure, but rather just as much on the ability to work together in European projects 
and political projects. This is particularly the case in eastern Germany and the new member 
states of eastern Europe, which had been cut off from European economic integration processes 
for many decades. (Wolfgang Tiefensee in Federal Ministry of Transport Building and Urban 
Affairs (Germany), 2006, pp. i, my translation) 
The message is clear: by encouraging economic contacts, cooperation across borders thus can 
improve the economic possibilities for struggling regions in eastern Germany. Given Germany’s 
central location [Mittellage], eastern Germany’s existing networks and expertise in eastern 
Europe and the sheer number of active cooperation arrangements, the same report concludes that 
eastern Germany can serve as mediator between the two sides of Europe: 
The eastern part of Germany serves in the role of mediator in this process. The new federal states 
profit from experiences of the old Länder and west European regions. They take this knowledge 
and adapt it based on their own experiences and according to the concrete conditions on the 
ground and pass this value-added know-how along to east European partners. (Federal Ministry 
of Transport Building and Urban Affairs (Germany), 2006, p. 1) 
With the declining importance of spatial redistribution as a raison d’état, transboundary regions 
fill a certain role here by “allowing structurally weak areas to tap into specific development 
potentials and thus diminishing economic and social disparities” (ibid, p. 44). Importantly, as 
pointed out by Preusscher (2005, p. 6), regions have little choice but to listen to the federal 
government in this regard, since receipt of money from Brussels is often contingent upon co-
financing from the state. In the case of eastern German Länder, regional governments are also 
dependent on the federal state for continued financial supports as mentioned above. The 
imprimatur of the state—while mediated heavily by other levels—is thus assured. 
Role of the region: a case from Saxony 
 
The relevance of transboundary regions to processes of rescaling becomes visible in the regions 
as well, and my research along the Czech-German border is an appropriate case study in this 
regard. Officials in local and provincial governments in Dresden, Saxony, Germany, and Ústí 
nad Labem, Czech Republic were interviewed in 2006 and the summer of 2007. I also examined 
a variety of official documents from the relevant government institutions and press releases 
related to cross-border cooperation. During the winter and spring of 2006, I also observed a 
coordinating meeting of the 3-CIP cross-border region in Ústí (February 2006). 
In the case of Saxony, enthusiasm for cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic is 
motivated by a sense of opportunity and ‘this is where our future is,’ but also partly by a sense of 
admiration and nervousness. When a factory worker in Chemnitz looks eastward towards Poland, 
where wages are much lower than what she is earning for a similar job, and where workers 
demand far less of management, the writing is on the wall. There is a fairly widespread 
perception among Germans in the state of Saxony, judging by an analysis of regional 
newspapers, that Poles and Czechs—especially those just the other side of the border—have 
more of the same qualities they associate with themselves such as work ethic, job skills, and 
dependability as contrasted with someone from further to the east in Belarus or Bulgaria. 
Experimental regionalism and the EU 
 
“Viewed globally, [cross-border cooperation] is really our only chance to develop collectively. 
We can’t do it on our own.” Interview with official of the state of Saxony, March 30, 2007 
(author’s translation) 
Within the regional government in Saxony, a collective wisdom has emerged that the EU 
enlargement of 2004, which made its border no longer the ‘eastern frontier’ of Europe, must 
figure into development strategies. Saxony, along with most other German Länder, has a sizable 
section of its state government devoted to international relations and projects, and its top 
ministers will travel ‘abroad’ several times a year on trade missions. The smaller scale of 
immediately bordering regions, such as Euroregion partner regions, are typically not high enough 
profile for top ministers so that such tasks are left to lower level bureaucrats. Meanwhile, a figure 
such as the Minister President is engaged in a regular foreign policy, attempting to profile his/her 
region throughout the world. The meaning of official appointments only with others ‘auf 
Augenhöhe’ (‘at eye level’), once an almost sacred German bureaucratic principle, has been 
broadened in such a global-player context, and might even include a meeting with the Russian 
president or the Israeli prime minister. While the jurisdiction of ministers of a Land is 
geographically clearly delimited, there is obvious appeal in increasing the spatial reference 
points in order to make the region more attractive. To paraphrase the typical discourse in this 
regard, Saxony is not tucked away in a forgotten corner of south-eastern Germany, but rather it is 
located at a crossroads in the heart of Central Europe [Mitte Mitteleuropas]. It not only 
encompasses the territorial expanse labeled “Saxony” on a map, but it functions in a mediating 
role between East and West, and so forth. 
The territorialization of these regional strategies is growing in size. Euroregions, as previously 
mentioned, are intended for human interactions on relatively small scales, but investors do not 
think in these terms. This helps to explain the emergence of “large-space projects” [“grossraum 
Projekte”] such as the one described below.6 3-CIP (3 Countries Innovation Push), the rather 
unsexy project name for a collaborative arrangement pursued under the aegis of the EU’s 
Interreg IIIC program, is one case worthy of further attention. This region encompasses the states 
of Brandenburg and Saxony in Germany, as well as three districts of northern Bohemia in the 
Czech Republic (Karlovarský kraj, Ústecký kraj and Liberecký kraj) and the Polish voivodeships 
Dolnośląskie (Lower Silesia), Lubuskie, and Wielkopolskie (Greater Poland). Curiously, the 
German city-state of Berlin, whose government declined to participate, creates a hole within the 
region, which certainly presents a challenge to the coherence of such a region down the road. It 
is possible that Berlin, whose global city aspirations are no secret, was uncomfortable 
considering itself as being on the periphery of a central European economic region. (Figs. 2, 3). 
 
Fig. 2 
3-CIP region, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic 
 
Fig. 3 
Euroregions along the border of Saxony, Germany 
EU projects such as this one require a lead partner, and unsurprisingly, Saxony is the initiator 
and lead partner for 3-CIP. The vision of a globally relevant region in the heart of Europe (with 
Saxony at the center) clearly attracts varying degrees of enthusiasm among participating regional 
governments and institutions. Such a region, so the hope, couples the strengths of both the 
German side (superior infrastructure, transparency in bureaucratic order, and dependably well-
trained workforce) with those of Poland and the Czech Republic (basically, low wages and high-
skills). But arguably the image conveyed by such salesmanship is more favorable to the German 
side, as the Poles and Czechs are not rushing out to call attention to higher levels of corruption, 
opaque bureaucratic structures, or substandard infrastructure. Moreover, the different respective 
political structures essentially propel the German side into the driver’s seat. Germany can be 
considered a strong federal state, where the individual Länder, including Saxony, have fairly 
clearly defined administrative competencies, and as a consequence, they are able to pursue 
relationships across borders relatively unencumbered by the national government in Berlin. 
Poland, by contrast, is still quite centralized, with the voivodeships maintaining very little 
autonomy vis-à-vis the central government in Warsaw. The Czech case lies somewhere in the 
middle: in spite of recent (2000) administrative reforms and decentralization, the kraje (regions) 
are still less self-assured in the European context than their German counterpart regions, though 
the imprint of the national government in Prague on the foreign affairs of the kraje is still less 
than in the case of Poland. Such a description is to be expected given the fact that eastern 
Germany simply had the well-established federal structures and relatively clear divisions of 
power of the West imposed immediately after unification, thus highlighting eastern Germany’s 
divergent post-1989 path from its other post-socialist neighbors. 
A bit of exploration of 3-CIP documentation is instructive in this regard. The following quotes 
from strategy documents and public proclamations offer insights into the thinking of regional 
officials (again, particularly on the German side) with respect to how and why such a regional 
mobilization is pursued: 
Border regions are often disadvantaged regions. In consequence of [being peripheral] in national 
structure[s], they have to struggle with location’s set backs. Huge distances to economic centers, 
poor infrastructures and transport connections [mean] that border regions are less attractive for 
potential investors. They endanger themselves to be demoted to regions with transit function. 
Language barriers and different administration structures accrue in addition. (3-CIP Steering 
Group 2004) 
Whether more integration would remedy all of the symptoms of being a border region 
enumerated above is questionable. But moving on, there seems to be little choice but to 
cooperate: 
[…] with the enlargement of the EU area there are new chances for joint development. A lot of 
contacts and co-operation between German, Czech and Polish partners are developed daily and 
are being developed very well. A good foundation for the new Europeans challenges in the 
conflict between globalization and regionalization emerges from there. (ibid) 
This is framed not in the terms of low-level, ‘feel-good’ cooperation of Euroregions, but rather in 
the lofty, post-national, global-ese of Ohmae (1995) and others. More to the point, there is 
historical precedent for regionalizing here: 
There is yet another advantage: We can build on a historically grown economic area, which had 
been only once separated by the Second World War and which we now recollect. (ibid) 
Certainly it is not novel to use economic integration as an appropriate jumping off point in 
Europe. Indeed, the entire European integration project is more or less premised on integration of 
commerce preceding other sorts of integration (culture, etc.). But in this particular corner of 
Europe, relating again back to the delicate histories of dislocation, expulsion, hegemony, and so 
on, the reference to the historical economic integration of Northern Bohemia, Lower Silesia and 
Saxony/Brandenburg is not necessarily a fact taken for granted on all sides. It would be naïve to 
believe that the passage of time, or the “integration” of Europe, has caused all resentments to 
disappear—and my interviews confirm this is a constant, if publicly unmentioned, backdrop to 
discussions between Polish, German, and Czech partners. 
Drawing the seemingly arbitrary borders of the region in this way, it has some 16 million people, 
is physically as large as Austria and Switzerland, and has an economy as strong as Greece’s (3-
CIP Steering Group 2006). This region, with its “centuries-long” common history has the 
potential, according to its visionaries, to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by EU 
enlargement “for borderless economic cooperation […] between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe along 
important trans-European axes” (ibid.). This “strategic transnational alliance” is about both 
competition and cooperation (“coopetition”), as that is what makes all sides stronger according to 
the dominant logic of at least the authors of reports justifying the region’s existence. 
The vision of this particular transboundary space, linking nine regions in eastern Germany, 
western Poland and the northern Czech Republic, is as follows: 
1. We are convinced that the EU enlargement in 2004 has provided an additional and decisive 
stimulus for the development of the neighboring regions in the triangle between Germany, the 
Czech Republic and Poland into a common region of growth and prosperity. It is our firm 
intention to give our long-term and ambitious support to this development and use all 
opportunities of cross-border cooperation. 
  
2. Our joint efforts are directed towards representing the region as an attractive economic area in 
Europe and worldwide. […] 
  
3. A new idea that sets new cooperation standards shall be realised: The joint profiling, 
presentation and marketing of our Central European economic area. […] (3-CIP Steering Group 
2005). 
  
3-CIP was funded during the 2004–2006 EU funding cycle through Interreg III-C.7 Leaders in 
the relevant regions have agreed in principle to continue the project even without EU monies. 
The rationale for continuing is outlined in a Joint Declaration in 2007 by the participating 
institutions (see Table 1): 
The joint objective is to establish a profile and to undertake marketing measures to forge a strong 
and attractive economic region right in the heart of Europe. The participants wish to promote the 
development of a business region in which entrepreneurs, networks and branches as well as 
employees will find such beneficial conditions that they will be able to fully develop their true 
potentials. (3-CIP Steering Group 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Selected participating organizations in the successor region to 3-CIP (3-CIP Steering Group 
2007) 
Germany Czech Republic Poland 
Saxony Economic Development Corporation 
(WFS) Usti Region 
Lower Silesian 
Marshal Office 
Dresden Chamber of Commerce (IHK 
Dresden/Conact Center for Saxon-Polish Economic 
Cooperation) 
Regionální rozvojová 
agentura Ústeckého kraje, 
a.s. 
DIG Dolnośląska Izba 
Gospodarcza 
Federal Labor Agency/Saxony Regional Office) 
Česko-německá obchodní a 
průmyslová komora 
ZIG Zachodnia Izba 
Gospodarcza 
Federation of Saxon Industry (VSW) CzechInvest, Branch Liberec EUROPA FORUM 
Future Agency of the State of Brandenburg GmbH 
(ZAB) Česká sporitelna, a.s. SYGMA sp. z o.o. 
Center for Innovation and Technology GmbH 
(CIT) 
Krajska Hospodarska 
Komora Liberec Regioinfo 
s.r.o.   
 
In observing trilateral meetings of 3-CIP in Germany and the Czech Republic, and in 
conversations with various officials, it was clear that there were frustrations on all sides, 
revolving in part around the cultural differences alluded to earlier, but also because of different 
levels of expectations concerning the project: generally, the German side wanted more 
cooperation than they were receiving in presenting the region to the outside as a single, unified 
location fit for global investment, while the Czech and Polish sides were concerned that the 
German side was acting in its own self interest. Several factors contribute to uneven levels of 
engagement, but at the forefront among them is the highly developed set of economic 
development institutions on the German side (and their need to justify their existence by concrete 
results in a challenging business environment) and the higher concentration of high-wage service 
sector and technology jobs in and around the urban agglomerations of Dresden and Leipzig. 
Planning meetings, which in my experience were attended by local and regional administration 
officials and economic development officers, generally revolve around the sharing of general 
information and recent events from each respective participant’s region, discussion of matters of 
note for the region as a whole (such as progress towards completion of the high-speed autobahn 
linking Dresden and Prague, and discussions of industries that have some cross-border relevance 
as far as cluster formation is concerned. Even at this relatively small scale, simultaneous 
translation German–Polish–Czech is provided, though at some meetings the working language is 
either English, or more commonly, German. 
The main focus of this paper is not the cultural-historical geographies of this area, but it is worth 
mentioning briefly some of the potential hurdles to successful region-building. Focusing on 
cultural attributes, Knippschild (2006, p. 2) offers a plausible explanation for the lack of 
transferability of western experience with regionalism to places such as Saxony. The border 
between Saxony and the Czech Republic and Poland is a “hard border.” Linguistic differences, 
and widespread mutual antipathy towards learning the neighbor region’s language, are two 
complications. Indeed, even in historically German-speaking regions 20 km from the border into 
the Czech Republic, it was rare to find even well-educated bureaucrats who spoke German. Even 
rarer was to find officials in regional administration offices on the German side who could 
exchange even pleasantries in Czech.8 Another factor pointed out by Knippschild is the difficult 
historical context of this corner of Central Europe. Constructing a cross-border regional identity 
is complicated by mutual distrust dating to very ugly histories of displacement and expulsion 
during and after World War II. 
Gauging the ‘success’ of this cross-border arrangement would be difficult for a number of 
reasons. More important, though, is what such cooperation tells us about scales of exchange and 
interaction. Local and regional officials in this border area have become thoroughly international 
in their thinking and orientation, and they have become skilled at deploying funds from the EU 
and other sources in order to pursue their own localized strategies for making the region 
competitive under harsh global conditions. Hence, the value in looking beyond existing territorial 
structures to the geographies of “unusual” or “experimental” regions becomes apparent on the 
ground. 
Scale as a frame of analysis for transboundary regionalism 
 
On its own, 3-CIP, with its youth, a relatively meager budget (around €1 million), and modest 
name-recognition as far as transboundary arrangements go, is not currently fundamentally 
changing European geography. Nor is that the point of this discourse. Rather, I have used it as an 
example of the ways in which transboundary space is being mobilized in the absence of clearly 
defined, mutually agreed-upon conceptions of what cross-border cooperation in Europe should 
look like. Given that the “revolutionary transformation” in eastern Germany (Turnock 2001, p. 2) 
is still relatively new compared with other major state-building processes in the industrial world, 
the region makes a particularly attractive site for examining these processes. 
More broadly, this discussion can contribute to understandings of space and territoriality in 
contemporary Europe as places attempt to jump on the boxcar while the globalization train 
moves at full speed. There is, of course, still much confusion (recall the hole where Berlin should 
be), and there is as yet fairly little material for scholars to grasp hold of clear territorial 
demarcations of “new state spaces” (Brenner 2004). This is where the geographical concept of 
scale is useful. 
Scale debates 
 
The last two-and-a-half decades have seen a blossoming interest among geographers in the 
concept of scale. No longer simply a static gauge (scale = static, pre-1980s) employed at the 
outset of a research project to delimit the scope of inquiry, many geographers, and particularly 
critical human geographers, treat scale as a dynamic, politicized spatial trope that helps us 
understand all aspects of socio-spatial phenomena (scale = structured/constructed, 1980s–2000s). 
One of the reasons for the prominence, persistence, and passion of debates over scale during 
recent decades is that they are informed by both structuralist (Smith 1995; Swyngedouw 1997) 
and poststructuralist (Jones 1998; Marston 2000) perspectives.9 Whether conceived as material 
(i.e. actually-existing) or socially constructed (i.e. an epistemology), there is general agreement 
that scale is politicized and instrumentalized. 
Once neo-Marxist geographers began to fundamentally challenge a taken-for-granted view of 
scale as merely an organizing principle for the world, studies proliferated that were aimed at 
understanding how the different scales (along a continuum from local to global) were in fact 
“brought into being” by specific actors towards particular ends (summarized by Herod 2003). 
The early period of critical scalar analyses saw fruitful inquiry into world systems theory, in 
which the global system (macro-scale) interacted with the local (micro-scale) in a regime of 
“systematic surplus transfers,” where an intermediary meso-scale (e.g. regions) played little if 
any substantive role (Meyer et al. 1992). For the most part, ‘the global’ was more powerful than 
‘the local’ in early critical analyses of scalar politics; indeed, globalization studies are based 
largely on the assumption of the local being relatively powerless in the face of global processes 
of economic integration. Yet in some ways these embryonic writings on scale ran counter to the 
fact that geographers had, for the most, always been interested in regions as an organizing 
principle—or organizing scale—of space situated somewhere between the local and global. In 
the intervening years, regions and regional geography have been partially revived in geography 
(Allen et al. 1998; Johnston et al. 1990; MacLeod and Jones 2001; Murphy 2006), and this has 
been accompanied by a return of meso-scale (i.e. regions) analysis of scalar processes. This 
category of scale complicates a teleological notion of the local-global continuum. The notion that 
regions play some sort of mediating role between local and global scales preserves a role for 
ongoing contact and engagement with regional constructs (for a comprehensive overview of 
these issues, see Sheppard and McMaster 2004). 
For political geographers, the scale debates occurring in the discipline since the 1980 s provide a 
welcome sharpening of one of the key tools at our disposal, for the analytical lens of scale can be 
usefully deployed to help understand regionalism in the European Union. Of particular 
consequence in a geoeconomic and geopolitical context of globalization are these questions 
(summarized by Claval 2006): what scales should be considered; how are scales being blurred; 
and, perhaps most important, how are particular scales implicated in fixing capital, and what role 
do which actors play in such scalar politics? 
Transboundary regionalism pursued with the blessing of the EU exists outside the political-
territorial structures available constitutionally within the borders of the German state, and yet it 
is understood as holding promise in helping put the eastern part of Germany on stable footing in 
a globalized economy. Local and regional elites, with the blessing of European and national 
officials, construct cross-border regions as a site of global competitiveness. Within these spaces, 
there is an effective absence of clear divisions of power and responsibility, hence their 
experimental character. Regionalism of this sort highlights the constructed nature of this scale. 
By my estimation, this includes portraying transboundary space as 
a European space with global import for the attraction of investment 
an asset to local and regional economic development efforts (‘moving beyond the provincial’) 
a cultural asset, by emphasizing historical-cultural normalcy of cross-border ties 
in the German case, a response to pressure on local and regional governance to appear proactive 
in addressing the shortcomings of unification. 
Inquiry utilizing scale can identify how the geographical imaginations of elites, with both power 
of purse and the capacity to shape public opinion, construct space to particular ends. A recent 
provocative polemic by Marston et al. (2005) assesses the state of affairs with respect to scale as 
an analytical tool and concludes that the concept should be packed off to the trash heap of 
intellectual history, replaced instead with what the authors refer to as a “flat ontology”. 
Scale = stale? 
 
Scale as it is frequently deployed, Marston et al. (2005) argue, locks us into rigid hierarchies and 
results in binaries (e.g. global vs. local) that have no relevance to the ways in which the world is 
organized, though as I have already pointed out, the meso-scale (represented by regions) has 
made a comeback of sorts yet is not mentioned by the authors. Related, they criticize the frequent 
use of the God-trick in scalar research: invoking the familiar language of poststructural criticisms 
of positivist spatial science, they argue that “form determin[es] content” (i.e. shape of the scale 
restricts ambit of inquiry) and an Archimedian perspective assumes the researcher’s objectivity 
(p. 422). In sum, these represent “foundational weaknesses” (p. 417) and justify searching for 
new alternatives to scale. One must acknowledge that Marston et al. are not alone in questioning 
the usefulness of scale (they cite, among others, De Landa 2002; Deleuze 1994; Howitt 1993). 
Moreover, their provocation is in the rich tradition of other critical scholars who have proposed 
radical solutions as a means of shaking the tree that represents a particularly laden concept (for a 
proposal to dismiss “culture” from our vocabularies, see Mitchell 1995). 
Paasi (2004) acknowledges that scale can be a ‘chaotic conception’ or a ‘bad abstraction’ (citing 
Howitt 1993; Jonas 1994), but unlike Marston et al. (2005), he sees a continuing role for scale in 
framing the key geographical concepts of place and region. Region and, in particular, 
geography’s “regional method” represent critical intermediaries between the raw, anonymous 
global forces and the familiar, but increasingly besieged, local. Paasi is surely correct when he 
writes that 
Scales are not fixed, separate levels of the social world but, like regions/places, are structured 
and institutionalized in complex ways in de/reterritorializing practices and discourses that may 
be partly concrete, powerful and bounded, but also partly unbounded, vague or invisible. Scales 
are also historically contingent; they are produced, exist and may be destroyed or transformed in 
social and political practices and struggles. The institutionalization/deinstitutionalization of 
region, place and scale are in fact inseparable elements in the perpetual process of regional 
transformation (Paasi 2004, p. 542). 
A number of other respondents have also taken the authors’ treatment of scale to task (Collinge 
2006; Hoefle 2006; Jonas 2006; Leitner and Miller 2007). This prompt reaction, combined with 
the lack of any substantive resonance coming from geographers in favor of discarding scale in 
light of their piece, suggests that scale is withstanding this recent siege. 
As becomes clear, a major impetus for Marston et al.’s (2005) rejection of scale as a useful tool 
in the geographer’s toolbox is its implication in globalization studies and socio-spatial 
scholarship more generally. They are not just concerned with geographers’ insistence on the use 
of the global-local continuum, but also how popular authors (most notably Tom Friedman) have 
employed hierarchical language to send globalization blame up the ladder. Consequently, the 
blame for layoffs, pollution and other ills associated with global corporations is removed from 
the real individuals who make decisions, and is instead displaced upon the global (i.e. “global 
corporation”) with the rationale that such corporations can’t help but engage in antisocial 
behavior given the inexorable pressures of “globalization.” That climbing the ladder of scale too 
often suggests somehow a greater degree of causation (“global” as the most powerful causative 
force in contemporary human affairs) is a valid criticism. 
At the same time, however, it is important for us to guard against the tendency for some 
analytical tool, whether scale, space, place, to be essentialized or imbued with causal force (see 
e.g. Collinge 2005; Zierhofer 2002). For elected and unelected European officials, local and 
regional authorities, economic development professionals, etc., the starting point in terms of the 
constructs addressed in this paper is not a particular scale per se, nor is their intent merely 
socially to construct something. Much as Murphy (1991, p. 25) observed more than fifteen years 
ago about regions, another construct utilized for understanding the geographies of economic and 
political change, scales today are not simply socially, but also literally, “constructed” to fulfill 
some utility. 
As the map of European regional initiatives shows, these spaces are not neatly nested within 
existing political geographies. They overlap, and it is this imbrication of space that makes scalar 
analysis useful, as they clearly do not fit well at either end of the global-local continuum. But 
global and local actors are implicated in making this meso-scale of European transboundary 
space what it is, as the case of 3-CIP shows. Scalar analysis, sensitive to the construction of a 
particular space towards a political–economic end, is most useful in understanding how the 
geography of Europe is changing in modern times. 
Conclusion 
 
There can be little doubt that the European project has been at least in part about the purposeful 
reorganization of space in the service of goals common to the collective peoples contained with 
the European Union. Going back in time to the very inception of a unified Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II, one can witness in those early writings a burgeoning sense that there 
must be territorial reorganization of one sort or another if Europe, or “Europeans,” were indeed 
to become “post-national” (Delanty 2005). And EU regional policy arguably is the clearest and 
most compelling evidence we have of this reorganization. Begun in the 1970 s, propelled to new 
heights in the 1980s, and reaching maturity during the past fifteen years or so, regionalism on 
paper is about breaking down boundaries for the good of the whole. But to what ends, other than 
the stated goals? How similar are the goals of those actors implementing transboundary 
arrangements on the ground to the goals of those in Brussels deciding who gets funded and who 
does not? Is the idealistic purpose of socio-cultural integration sublimated into the more 
“realistic” policy goal of economic cohesion, and if economic cohesion is more important, where 
does wealth redistribution fit into the equation? 
Using the example of transboundary arrangements along the border of eastern Germany with the 
Czech Republic and Poland, I have shown that the politics of scale surrounding European 
regions are largely inseparable from the local and national politics of economic development. In 
the case of eastern Germany, the project of creating an economically sustainable successor 
region to the former Communist state—and the desire of local officials to be seen contributing to 
this effort—tells us more about the politics of transboundary cooperation than piles of EU 
communiqués. Mobilizing cross-border space along the border with the Czech Republic and 
Poland in the interests of European integration, under the scenario presented here, is co-opted by 
the nationalized context of curing eastern Germany’s ills. 
What are the implications of this particular politics of scale? At this point the conclusions must 
be speculative; it is still too soon to determine the “success” of regional construction in this 
particular part of Europe. Yet if as Jönsson et al. (2000, p. 46) suggest, regions are created by 
social processes that result in “shared ways of thinking,” and only then can lasting structures of 
integration be built, then regionalism built upon highly uneven engagement (some might say 
unidirectional) at the behest of domestic political considerations in one of the participating states 
is inherently problematic. And how are we to understand these processes without using scale, 
particularly a conceptualization of scale that emphasizes its constructed, produced and political 
natures? Along the lines of Leitner and Miller (2007), I would argue scale offers an invaluable 
analytical tool for understanding processes at work in European integration. In sum, the point of 
the arguments presented here is that scalar politics are so transient, so fixed to the short-term 
wants of political and economic decision-making, that what is required is a more robust and 
sophisticated conceptualization of scale, and emphatically not its abandonment as a concept at 
our disposal. If scalar politics are marked by a fleeting utilitarianism, as I argue here, then the 
scholar’s role is to unveil how and where these processes are occurring, and not to change the 
terms we use to identify and analyze them. 
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Footnotes 
1 I thank a reviewer for this observation. 
 2 Though as one reviewer points out, even these western regions are not necessarily prominent 
features on the perceptual maps of citizens. 
 3 Common examples of “coopetition” from the business work include when competing airlines 
form frequent flier and network alliances, or when otherwise competing computer companies 
(i.e. Apple and Microsoft) cooperate on the development of software. 
 4 Saxony Ministry of Economics and Labor, 
http://www.smwa.sachsen.de/de/Foerderung/Interreg_III_C/100178.html accessed 10/15/2007.  
 5The five New Federal States, or neue Bundesländer, plus Berlin, were created in 1990 and 
integrated into the existing federal structures of the Federal Republic upon unification of the two 
German states. Under Germany’s federal structure the Länder have many exclusive 
competencies, ranging from education and culture, to law enforcement and taxation. In the 
context of this article, it is noteworthy that international relations fall under the purview of the 
national government. 
 6 Interview with government official in the State of Saxony government, March 30, 2007. 
 7 In the current funding framework, the name Interreg IIIC has been replaced by the term 
“Territorial Cooperative objective.” 
 8 Contrast this with the French–German border, where in German schools French was required, 
and where on the French side (particularly in Alsace) many learned German. Of course, Dutch, 
Flemish and German are much more closely related than are Czech, Polish and German; more 
important in this context perhaps is a well-developed system of learning foreign languages in 
both the Netherlands and Belgium since the mid-twentieth century, which makes it rare to find 
an educated person who cannot speak German. 
 9 I acknowledge the limitations of these two simplified categories. 
